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Institutional Economics and the Behaviour of Conservation 
Organizations:Implications for Biodiversity Conservation 
 
Abstract 
This article draws mostly on new institutional economics to consider the likely 
behaviours of non-government conservation organizations and the implications of 
these behaviours for biodiversity conservation.  It considers how institutional factors 
may result in behaviour of conservation NGOs diverging from their objectives, 
including their support for biodiversity conservation; examines aspects of rent capture 
and conservation alliances; specifies social factors that may restrict the diversity of 
species supported by NGOs for conservation; considers bounded rationality in relation 
to the operation of conservation NGOs; and using game theory, shows how 
competition between NGOs for funding can result in economic inefficiencies and 
narrow the diversity of species supported for conservation.  It also considers generally 
how the social role of conservation NGOs should be assessed. 
 
 Institutional Economics and the Behaviour of Conservation 
Organizations:Implications for Biodiversity Conservation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Drawing on aspects of new institutional economics, this article examines institutional 
factors that may influence the behaviour of non-governmental conservation bodies 
and their implications for biodiversity conservation. Principal-and-agent problems are 
shown to be relevant, the question of rent capture is discussed, and several influences 
on selection by NGOs of focal species for their conservation efforts (such as whether 
they favour species that are more human-like, or charismatic or which could generate 
significant local impact on incomes via tourism generation) are considered. The 
competitive efficiency of NGOs in securing funding for promoting the conservation of 
different species, as well as the possible impact of this competition on the extent of 
conservation of biodiversity, is examined using analysis based on the theory of games. 
It is doubtful if this type of competition is efficient or promotes biodiversity 
conservation to the extent achievable. However, drawing on views presented by 
Hagedorn (1993), it is argued that the role of conservation NGOs should not be 
assessed solely on their economic efficiency but the political acceptability of their 
contributions to policy should also be taken into account, as well as other factors. A 
multidimensional approach is required to assess the role of such bodies in society. 
Furthermore, even if the actions of NGOs are not perfect in conserving biodiversity, it 
may not be possible to create institutions that give superior results. Utopian results are 
impossible to achieve. 
 
So far, there appears to have been little application of institutional economics to the 
behaviour of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as conservation 
organizations, although there have been attempts by political scientists and 
sociologists to adopt institutional approaches to wildlife conservation as pointed out, 
for example, by Haas (2004). However, it seems likely that the theories, for example, 
of Niskanen (1971) about the behaviour of bureaucracies, aspects of the theory of 
games, theories of group behaviour as outlined by Olson (1965), Simon’s views on 
administrative man (Simon, 1961) and the new institutional economics championed 
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by Williamson (1986, 1975) would be applicable. In addition, some aspects of old or 
traditional economics appear to be relevant.  
 
The purpose of the article is to explore the relevance of institutional economics to the 
behaviour of conservation organizations and to assess the predicted performance of 
such organizations in pursuing their conservation goals, giving examples where 
possible, and to consider factors that may restrict the ability of their strategies to 
conserve biodiversity. 
 
Conservation bodies are usually concerned with ‘ensuring’ the supply of 
environmental goods and avoiding the production of public bads. The goods (or bads) 
concerned are usually shared by a considerable number of persons either partially or 
completely in contrast to private goods. These are commodities for which markets are 
missing or partially missing. The methods that NGOs use to contribute to the supply 
of public or quasi-public conservation goods are varied. They may, for instance, raise 
funds from the public (or their members) to directly provide the good, for example, a 
protected area; try to convince private individuals to supply the good and assist them 
to do so, and lobby governments to provide funds for the NGO’s conservation efforts 
or persuade the government directly to supply the focal environmental good of 
interest to the NGO. 
 
The Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust (YEPT) in New Zealand, for example, has as its 
prime goal the conservation of the Yellow-eyed Penguin (YEP) Megadyptes 
antipodes, which is listed by the IUCN as an endangered species. To pursue its 
mission, the Trust raised funds initially from the public and was subsequently also 
able to obtain some funding from the New Zealand Government. This funding 
continues and the Trust has also obtained funding from some private companies. The 
Trust disseminates information about the conservation status of the YEP, engages 
directly in programmes to conserve it and has acquired a limited amount of land for 
the purpose of directly protecting this species. As well, it encourages landholders to 
covenant land (that is, ocean shore areas) suitable for the conservation of the YEP, 
gives landholders advice on the conservation of the YEP on their land, and so on. It 
also conducts research, has a small permanent staff and makes use of local volunteers 
in its activities. It is able to exert some political pressure on government to ensure that 
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its policies do not threaten the survival of the YEP. Thus, it performs all of the types 
of functions mentioned above. 
 
While many conservation NGOs combine all these functions, not all do. Some for 
example, do not directly supply any environmental goods but merely act as political 
pressure groups, trying to influence public policy by lobbying and by the strategic 
dissemination of information. The Australian Liberal-National Party Government 
while in power in the early part of this century moved to reduce public funding for the 
latter type of institutions. 
 
Consider in turn how the objectives of conservation NGOs may be influenced by 
institutional factors, the relevance of the bounded rationality of individuals to the 
activities of these NGOs, and consider how efficient they are likely to be in pursuing 
conservation objectives. This will be followed by a broader assessment of the social 
value of these organizations and some discussion of the relevance of traditional 
institutional economics to the evolution of conservation NGOs. 
 
2. Institutional Factors and the Objectives of Conservation NGOs 
Conservation NGOs, especially large ones, are liable to be influenced by principal-
and-agent problems, of the type outlined by Perloff (2004, pp. 689,722), for example. 
Their members may be unable or unwilling to exert control over their administrators 
and employees for similar reasons (mostly the transaction costs involved) to those 
observed in the case of large public corporations. National and international NGOs 
may be particularly prone to the agency problem. Many members may find it too 
costly to attend annual general meetings and participate in decision-making by the 
NGO. The problem is likely to be less acute in the case of locally based community 
NGOs. 
 
The larger the size and the greater the geographical spread of a conservation NGO, the 
more likely are agency problems to be present. The more likely too is its management 
to be in the hands of staff, many of whom may not be members of the NGO, or who 
may place their personal interest above that of rank-and-file members. The agency 
problem implies that managers or staff of NGOs have some scope to pursue their own 
goals as distinct from those of the NGO. 
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 Given the theory of bureaucracy as outlined by Niskanen (1971), managers (staff) of 
conservation NGO might be primarily interested in the growth of their organisation 
and/or obtaining sufficient funding to ensure its continuing existence. While some 
rank-and-file members of the NGO may also want this, the NGO’s managers may be 
more inclined to compromise the conservation objectives of the NGO to obtain 
increased funds for their NGO. 
 
They may, for example, form alliances with bodies mainly interested in economic 
development, either to obtain funds directly from these bodies or via a joint approach 
to government for funds. The reason given for the alliance by the NGO’s executive 
might be that with the alliance, the conservation NGO will have some influence on the 
nature of development but without the alliance it has none. Therefore, compromise is 
necessary to ensure that developers take some account of conservation. The extent to 
which this is really the case and how much compromise is necessary to ensure 
conservation influence is unclear. However, Figure 1 may help to illustrate some of 
the issues. 
 
y 
I1 
 
Figure 1:  Compromise of conservation goals as an option for a conservation 
NGO 
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In Figure 1, curve ABCD indicates the amount of funding that a conservation NGO 
can expect as a function of the degree to which it is prepared to compromise its 
conservation goals as measured by an indicator in the range 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. This figure 
shows that the NGO can increase its funding by engaging in some compromise but 
will lose funds if it is too compromising. Probably in most cases, D is lower than A 
because a conservation NGO that is too compromising will lose its credibility as a 
conservation organization. 
 
If the managers of NGOs act as Niskanen-type bureaucrats, they will favour the 
degree of compromise shown by x1 because this maximises the funds available to the 
NGO. In effect, their indifference curves would be a series of horizontal lines of 
which I11  I11 indicates one. If the members of the NGO are strongly committed 
conservationists, they may however, favour no compromise and prefer situation A. 
Their preferences would be indicated by a series of vertical indifference curves (not 
shown) with situations further to the left being favoured. In large organizations, 
however, it is possible that situation C rather than A will prevail if the bureaucrats are 
merely interested in the amount of funding obtained for their organization. Because of 
agency problems, members of the NGO may not be able to control a large NGO’s 
managers effectively. Of course, particularly in smaller and more localised NGOs 
where members can exert greater control over management, management may be 
unable to deviate so far from the conservation goals of the principals of the NGO. In 
moderately sized NGOs, it is possible that the ‘effective’ indifference curves are like 
those represented by I1I1 in Figure 1. This results in a degree of compromise 
corresponding to x0 because the actions of the NGO’s managers are restricted by its 
members. The situation has some similarities to that outlined by Williamson (1964) 
when developing the theory of behaviour of managers in public companies. 
 
3. Rent Capture and Conservation Alliances 
When public demand for conservation goods grows rapidly, this growth may generate 
possible rents for those engaged in the facilitation of their provision. An interesting 
question is who captures these rents?  In some cases, it may be executives in 
conservation NGOs but it can also be public servants and to a lesser extent academics. 
Consider the following case. 
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The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), (a large conservation NGO in 
Australia) formed an alliance with the National Farmers’ Federation (a peak farmers’ 
pressure group) in 1989 to promote the Landcare Programme. The aim of this project 
was to encourage farmers to take more care of their land for conservation purposes. 
As a result of their joint approach to the Australian Government, these NGOs were 
able to achieve a large amount of government funding for the project, the Landcare 
Programme which is still continuing. Possibly the interest of the ACF in the project 
was to extend its range of influence and that of the NFF was to create a more 
favourable impression of the role of farmers in conservation. Since participation in the 
programme by farmers was voluntary and subsidised by the Government, it was 
clearly quite acceptable to farmers. Whether or not the ACF itself expected to obtain 
more funding from the government or ensure continuing support for its funding from 
the government as a result of its decision is unclear but it is possible. The ACF obtains 
some funds from the government and private contributions to this NGO are tax 
deductible. 
 
This alliance was very favourable to the Australian Liberal-National Party 
Government which wanted to partially privatise Telstra, a state-owned 
telecommunications enterprise. This plan was unpopular with farmers who feared that 
rural telecommunications services might suffer as a result of partial privatisation of 
this state enterprise.  As a ‘carrot’ to farmers, the Australian Government announced 
that it would fund partially its support for Landcare from the funds obtained by the 
partial sale of Telstra. This move helped to placate farmers and was looked on 
favourably by conservationists. 
 
Now it appears that eventually, the ACF gained little control over the Landcare 
Programme. Most funds for the programme are channelled through government 
departments, mainly the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and are 
administered by the government. It is possible that public servants have captured most 
of the rents and the ACF obtained little, if any of those. Considerable red tape 
(transaction costs) appears to be involved in application for community funding under 
the programme and government bureaucrats may now be the main beneficiaries. The 
‘red tape’ involved helps to keep public servants in employment. A further problem is 
that with strict accountability rules in the public service, much of the red tape may be 
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difficult to eliminate. Thus, the original alliance between the ACF and the NFF has 
evolved in a way which may not have been fully envisaged by the partners when they 
proposed the Landcare Programme. 
 
Similar issues seem to have arisen in relation to the European Unions’ reformed 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP has been reformed and continues to be 
reformed so that it is more environmentally friendly but the transaction costs involved 
in the new policy seem to be very high even though the actual transfers to civil 
servants for administering the scheme are not known. Although the WWF 
(Worldwide Fund for the Conservation of Nature) was invited to participate in the 
planning of the reformed scheme, it declined; possibly because it was afraid of being 
compromised. 
 
4. Social Influences on the Selection by NGOs of Focal Species for 
Conservation Efforts – Factors Restricting the Diversity of Species 
Favoured. 
Conservation NGOs may favour promotion of a narrow range of species of wildlife 
for conservation. Metrick and Weitzman (1996, 1998) suggest that these are likely to 
be species that are more charismatic than others and of which the members are larger 
in size. It has also been claimed that humans like to favour the conservation of species 
that are more human-like than others (Plous, 1993, DeKay and McClelland, 1996 
Gunnthorsdottir, 2001) presumably because humans have greater empathy for these. 
This suggests a preference for mammals over other taxa and probably species with 
eyes placed forward on the skull.  
 
While there is some support for these views (Tisdell et al. 2006), the situation is more 
complex than appears at first sight because there seems to be a high degree of social 
support for survival of some non-mammalian species, such as some species of turtles 
(Tisdell et al. 2005). In line also with the views of traditional institutionalists, there is 
evidence that social attitudes of individuals to the survival of different species of 
wildlife are to a large extent socially (culturally) conditioned (Tisdell et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, if portrayals of species (eg: in folk tales and stories, cartoons) repeatedly 
emphasize or exaggerate the human-like appearance or qualities of species, they may 
alter human attitudes to them. Again, humans may prefer species that seem soft and 
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cuddly - children prefer such objects. Some writers, therefore, argue that conservation 
NGOs excessively focus their conservation efforts on the conservation of charismatic 
species to the neglect of other species, e.g. keystone species, that may be very 
important in relation to the maintenance of biodiversity. 
 
In their defence, some conservation bodies argue that without an emphasis on flagship 
and charismatic species, they would collect a much smaller amount of funds which 
would adversely affect their overall conservation impact. Even though the outcome 
may not be optimal, it is the best attainable outcome, in the view of some NGOs, 
given the social circumstances. Furthermore, some of the species may be umbrella 
species and thus their conservation could result in the conservation of other valued 
species. This is because conservation of the habitat of the focal umbrella species also 
incidentally conserves other species.  
 
It is, possible that some conservation organizations exploit charismatic wildlife 
species to obtain funds for the organization itself. For example, an Australian study of 
funding for the conservation of the koala and the northern hairy-nosed wombat found 
that although the koala was not endangered that funding for its conservation was 
much greater than for the critically endangered hairy-nosed wombat (Tisdell and 
Swarna Nantha, in press). Reasons could be that the koala is better known to the 
public, it is regarded as more human-like, and it is a mixed economic good whereas, 
at this time, the northern hairy-nosed wombat is a pure public good and is less well 
known. 
 
The koala is a mixed economic good because it is a private good in koala parks and 
zoos and is widely used as an icon for promotional purposes. Campaigns ‘to save’ the 
koala are likely to be supported by owners of koala parks and zoos, possibly partly to 
buy moral worthiness. In part, there may be bias of conservation bodies in favour of 
species that are mixed goods. By contrast, the northern hairy-nosed wombat is a pure 
public good (Tisdell and Swarna Nantha, in press). It is confined to a forest reserve 
where scientists are trying to increase its population. It is not allowed in zoos or 
private collections, and the public is excluded from the reserve containing its remnant 
population. 
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Sometimes conservation NGOs directly conserve mixed economic goods or quasi-
public goods themselves by relying on economic exclusion possibilities. For example, 
the Otago Peninsula Trust in New Zealand is instrumental in protecting a colony of 
the Northern Royal Albatross Diomedea sanfordi at Taiaroa Head. This species is 
listed by the IUCN as endangered. Visitors pay to see this albatross colony at 
relatively close range (Tisdell 1990, Ch.7; Higham, 2001). The colony nests at this 
site. Their payments constitute the major source of funds for this NGO and in recent 
years the Trust has been able to obtain a financial surplus from operations of its Royal 
Albatross colony which it has used to subsidise other conservation activities (The 
Otago Peninsula Trust, 2005). Similarly, the Mareeba Wetland Foundation manages a 
wetland wildlife reserve in the Atherton Tablelands in Northern Queensland. A 
substantial amount of its funds are obtained from visitors to this wetland who pay to 
enter this reserve which conserves a number of wild species in a natural setting. In 
both cases, components of the conserved commodity for which exclusion is possible 
help finance the organizations involved. 
 
Some conservation bodies may favour conservation projects that have a substantial 
and demonstrable local positive economic impact. This may help to generate local 
positive economic and other support for the NGO. However, conservation projects 
that have greatest local economic impact may not necessarily be those of greatest 
economic value. They may not, for example, maximise net social welfare – for 
instance, as estimated by the use of social cost-benefit analysis (Tisdell, 2006). 
 
This raises a social dilemma. Suppose, for example, that there are two species A and 
B that could be conserved in a local area by a similar level of investment but that 
funds are sufficient to conserve only one and their conservation is mutually exclusive. 
A social choice must be made about which one to conserve. If A is conserved, the net 
total economic value (TEV) of this is estimated to be $1 million and local income of 
$0.5 million is predicted to be generated. On the other hand, conservation of species B 
is estimated to yield a net TEV of $2 million but only generate $0.1 million in income 
locally. If net TEV is to be maximised, the project to conserve B is the optimal social 
choice but if local economic impact is to be the deciding factor, conservation of 
species A would be the appropriate social choice. 
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It is then a question of deciding what the appropriate social rules are. If the local 
community is, for example, very poor, it is possible that there would be a preference 
for the project that conserves species A. But what if the local community is rich? 
Should income transfers be made to the local community if this community is poor 
and it is decided to conserve species B? If so, how should these be made?  
 
5. Bounded Rationality and the Operation of Conservation NGOs 
Individuals are undoubtedly limited in their rationality, their knowledge and the span 
of their attention (Simon, 1961). Conservation NGOs by their communication help 
focus individual’s attention on objects to be conserved. This may reduce their 
attention to other objects given that the attention spans of individuals are limited. 
Thus, the supply of public goods or quasi-public goods promoted by NGOs may be 
favoured by targeted members of the public. It is by no means certain that the 
composition of the transmitted information is ideal, even if an ideal can be defined for 
transmission of such information. 
 
In the case of wildlife conservation, provision of information by NGOs may be 
focused on species which are estimated to generate the greatest public financial 
support for the NGO. These may not, however, be the most valuable species to 
conserve. 
 
Furthermore, there might be more emphasis than is socially desirable on species likely 
to suffer a decline in their existing population than on those for which an increase in 
their existing population is desirable. Results from psychological economics indicate 
that individuals are willing to pay more to avoid loss of a valued commodity than to 
pay for an equivalent gain. This has been called the status quo or endowment effect 
(Knetsch, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman et al., 1991). In general, 
individuals will be willing to pay more to avoid the loss of a species, the more 
imminent the loss is believed to be and the greater are the perceived adverse 
consequences of the loss. This may entice some conservation NGOs to exaggerate the 
degree of endangerment of their focal species and the extent of the adverse 
consequences of that loss. They hope as a result to marshal greater public action to 
conserve the species or secure more funds for the NGO. The public may not find it 
economic to scrutinise carefully the truth of statements made by NGOs. 
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 As in the lemons case (Akerlof, 1970), there is also a risk that dishonest NGOs or 
inefficient ones may collect funds from the public to help conserve wildlife species by 
supplying misleading information to the public. Information is asymmetric in this case. 
With increasing use of the internet, this problem may increase. 
 
6. The Efficiency of Conservation NGOs in Fund Raising and How Their 
Competition may Narrow the Diversity of Species Supported for 
Conservation. 
Conservation NGOs vary in the competency with which they carry out their missions. 
They appear to be less subject to competitive discipline than business firms. However, 
they must receive adequate funding to survive and/or contributions of voluntary 
services. They do not seem to be subject to the discipline of possible takeovers by 
raiding companies as many businesses are, nor to the discipline imposed by bankers 
as many businesses are in some countries e.g. Germany. 
 
The question arises of just how efficient the organizational structures of individual 
conservation NGOs in promoting biodiversity conservation are and just how efficient 
is the whole array of extant NGOs in doing this. To what extent should such bodies be 
decentralised?  What is the best organizational form for NGOs to achieve their 
mission?  Is for example a U-form (unitary form) or an M-form (multidivisional form) 
best (Williamson, 1986)?  Should they have a peak-type of organization to represent 
their interests nationally and internationally, such as the IUCN (World Conservation 
Union). Hagedorn (1993) suggests that governments (politicians) prefer to deal with 
peak civil organizations because this reduces their political transaction costs. This 
suggests that NGOs are more likely to influence Government policy if they have a 
peak organization. 
 
Sometimes, conservation NGOs duplicate the activities of one another, do not engage 
in co-ordinated action with one another and may forgo scale economies as a result. On 
the other hand, larger scales of operations may have drawbacks because of managerial 
‘slippage’ and greater knowledge deficiencies in larger organization as well as a 
reduced sense of belonging by individuals contributing to the activities of the 
conservation body. 
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 Some simple game theory models can be used to illustrate the point: conservation 
NGOs in following their own self-interest may fail to promote biodiversity and by 
competing reduce the total net funds available to them collectively or even in some 
cases, individually. Suppose two conservation NGOs, A and B and that each has two 
alternative strategies: promote species 1 or promote species 2. The net funds that they 
have donated depends upon which species they promote. 
 
There are several possibilities which can be illustrated by matrices. One possibility is 
illustrated in Table 1. The payoffs in the body of the matrix indicate the funds which 
the NGOs obtain for promoting the conservation of the different species, say in 
millions of dollars. Imagine that in the absence of support by NGOs to promote their 
conservation, each of the species will disappear. However, if a minimum of 2 million 
dollars is spent on fostering the conservation of an individual species, it will survive. 
 
  NGO B 
  Promote Species 1 Promote Species 2 
 
Promote Species 1 (2,2) (2,6) NGO A Promote Species 2 (6,2) (2.5, 2.5) 
 
Table 1: Matrix used to illustrate the incentives of NGOs to concentrate on 
the promotion of the same species and the possible shortcomings of this. 
 
If each NGOs motive is to maximise its funds then both will promote species 2. 
Consequently, species 1 receives no support and disappears but species 2 survives 
because the total promotional effort to save it equals $5 million. If the NGOs had been 
less selfish and had adopted either the contribution of strategies (A1BB2) or (A2B1B ) both 
species would have survived and collectively their funds would have been greater. 
Nevertheless, the outcome (A2BB2) prevails and forms a Nash Equilibrium. The result 
is not, however, Pareto sub-optimal for the players as it would be in the prisoners’ 
dilemma case. 
 
A Pareto sub-optimal case is illustrated in the matrix in Table 2. In the case shown 
there, both players (NGOs) acting in their selfish interest promote species 2. They 
obtain $0.75 million each as a result. This is Paretian sub-optimal outcome from their 
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point of view and the total promotional expenditure of $1.5 million is insufficient to 
save Species 2. Neither species is saved, in fact, though it is possible to save both by 
selecting either strategies (A1, B2) or (A2, B1). This is not to say that all Nash solutions 
in the prisoners’ dilemma case will always result in failure to save all the focal species. 
For instance, if in Table 2 the payoffs corresponding to (A2, B2) are (1.5, 1.5) the total 
promotional effort for species 2 is $3 million. Species 2 survives (but not Species 1) 
given the assumption that an expenditure of $2 million is required to ensure the 
survival of a species. Nevertheless, in both cases, the selfish actions of NGOs result in 
less biodiversity conservation than is attainable. 
 
Table 2: Matrix to show a prisoners’ dilemma type problem and failure of 
NGOs to promote biodiversity. 
 
  NGO B 
  Promote Species 1 
(B1) 
Promote Species 2 
(B2) 
 
Promote Species 1 (A1) 
 
(2,2) 
 
(2,6) NGO A 
Promote Species 2 (A2) (6,2) (0.75, 0.75) 
 
 
A third related case can also be envisaged. This is illustrated by Table 3. In this case, 
the self interest of each of the NGOs is to co-ordinate their strategies so that they do 
not accidentally promote the same species. 
 
Table 3: Matrix to illustrate a co-ordination problem for NGOs 
 
  NGO B 
  Promote Species 1 
(B1) 
Promote Species 2 
(B2) 
 
Promote Species 1 (A1) 
 
(2,2) 
 
(3,3) NGO A 
Promote Species 2 (A2) (3,3) (0.75, 0.75) 
 
 
However, we should not conclude that duplication of effort by NGOs to conserver 
species is always unfavourable to conservation. For example, if effort is spread over 
many species, in some cases threshold levels of expenditure for their conservation 
may not be reached only for a few species. By concentrating conservation efforts on 
fewer species, it is possible that thresholds for the conservation of a larger number of 
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species might be attained and greater biodiversity conserved. Again, however, there 
may not be social mechanisms that ensure that NGOs achieve the socially desired 
balance.  
 
7. How should the (Social) Role of Conservation NGOs be Assessed? 
The above discussion raises the issue of what is the appropriate way in which to 
assess the social role of conservation NGOs is unclear. Given the views of Hagedorn 
(1993), it would seem inappropriate to assess NGOs purely from an economic 
efficiency point of view; that is, in the terminology he uses, the quality of their 
decisions. In his view, attention should also be given to the political legitimacy and 
the political acceptability of their policy proposals. He is critical of the fact that 
agricultural economists have concentrated on the economic efficiency or quality of 
decisions by institutions or policies and have neglected the political sustainability of 
decision-making processes or proposals. 
 
If the most efficient policy alternatives are not politically acceptable, then they are 
irrelevant from a practical point of view. Proposed polices or institutional structures 
should be assessed taking into account both efficiency and political acceptability 
factors. For example, in Figure 2 the set bounded by OABCD may correspond to all 
policies that can address a particular social issue. A policy corresponding to point C 
would be the most efficient but not the most acceptable politically. The politically 
most acceptable one corresponds to point B. Should society choose point B or C or 
some point on the segment between these points? The policy corresponding to point C 
may maximize net social benefit using traditional CBA but that corresponding to B 
may give a distribution of benefits that makes it relatively more acceptable. 
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Figure 2:  Efficient institutions and policies may not always be politically 
acceptable. 
 
Another point to consider is that although an institutional structure does not provide 
the most efficient solution to social problem it may still have net benefits and no other 
feasible political alternative may be available. Thus, conservation NGOs may make a 
positive contribution to the supply of public or quasi-public conservation goods, a 
contribution which would not be made in their absence. Their contribution seems to 
be a positive one even though not perfect. Furthermore, no other workable 
institutional arrangements may be possible which will do a better job of filling 
conservation gaps. To be more specific in relation to biodiversity conservation, even 
if conservation NGOs are not as effective nor as efficient in promoting biodiversity 
conservation as they could be, their net contribution may be positive and superior 
institutional arrangements may not be possible. 
 
An additional factor to bear in mind is that conservation NGOs are a part of civil 
society. They may, therefore, act as useful counters to the power of the state, and they 
provide separate sources of information and expertise. This is valued in itself by those 
that favour open societies (Popper, 2002). 
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Again, another positive social contribution of conservation NGOs (and other NGOs) 
is that they provide extra avenues for individuals to ‘belong’ to society. Most NGOs 
rely on volunteers and donations from individuals to function. They provide an 
alternative to the workforce for social recognition of individuals. They can help 
counter social alienation and build community spirit. This all suggests that institutions 
need to be assessed from a multi-dimensional point of view. 
 
8. Concluding Comments 
The analysis in this article is exploratory. It has considered the possibility that new 
concepts in economies, such as those developed in new institutional economies, can 
help analyse the behaviour of conservation NGOs and shed light on the economic and 
social issues raised by the development of these organizations. This article should be 
regarded as suggestive rather than definitive. When considering the evolution of 
conservation NGOs and the types of missions or objectives they pursue, it is probably 
wise to study also cultural factors and changes in social values (see Tisdell et al. 
2006) as suggested by traditional economic institutionalists. 
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